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Abstract	  
Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg’s name has become synonymous with the July 
20, 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler and topple the Nazi regime.  However, the efforts of 
two other men, Major-General Henning von Tresckow and General Friedrich Olbricht, 
made the execution of this coup possible, and the Colonel merely stepped into the 
framework they established.  These two men were the primary, behind-the-scenes 
architects of the coup due to their experience in the opposition leading up to July 20, 
which included prior assassination attempts, knowledge of bombs, their guiding hands 
through the revision of Operation Valkyrie, and the network of contacts they had built.  
However, because they were so involved, Tresckow and Olbricht also claim a portion of 
the blame for the plot’s failure firstly because of the inherently flawed nature of 
Operation Valkyrie and secondly because their efforts to recruit loyal participants to the 
plot fell short. 
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On July 20, 1944, Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg planted a bomb inside the 
Wolf’s Lair, Adolf Hitler's military headquarters in East Prussia where the Führer was 
attending a briefing. This bomb was intended to kill Hitler and allow Stauffenberg and 
his fellow conspirators to seize power from the Nazis via the Replacement Army as 
specified in Operation Valkyrie.  The plotters hoped to end the tyrannical National 
Socialist regime and bring a swift end to World War II.  Unfortunately, the bomb failed 
to kill Hitler, and Stauffenberg along with many of his accomplices were executed.  
Although Stauffenberg appears to be the most important figure, the planning and 
execution of this plot would likely have been impossible without the efforts of two other 
men, Major-General Henning von Tresckow and General Friedrich Olbricht.  Tresckow 
and Olbricht were the main and most indispensable architects of the July 20 plot because 
they were seasoned members of the military resistance who applied the lessons they 
learned from prior experience to this latest putsch, most importantly their knowledge of 
how to execute a successful assassination and seize power afterwards by utilizing 
Operation Valkyrie.  Because they were the main engineers of this plot, they also deserve 
a significant portion of the blame for its failure, which is attributed in part to the 
inherently flawed nature and tardy execution of Operation Valkyrie, as well as Tresckow 
and Olbricht's lack of success in recruiting loyal participants to the coup.	  
Upon Hitler’s death as a result of the bomb Stauffenberg planted, the conspirators 
intended to initiate Operation Valkyrie.  The Nazis originally conceived Valkyrie as a 
plan for the mobilization of Replacement Army troops in the case of an internal 
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emergency,1 such as uprisings of forced laborers or the death of Hitler, so that order 
could be restored, and, if necessary, power could be smoothly transferred to the Führer’s 
successor.2  However, "Olbricht and others modified those plans to accommodate a 
military coup following Hitler's assassination" so that the National Socialist government 
would come to an end rather than continue.3  Essentially, the July 20 plotters would use 
Valkyrie to gain control of the government by making it appear as if the SS were staging 
a coup and an attack on the Wehrmacht (thereby creating internal unrest) after Hitler's 
death, "something the old line soldiers always feared."4  General Friedrich Olbricht 
would issue the codeword "Valkyrie" so the conspirators could seize power, while 
informing the German public that "a clique of Nazi Party bosses was trying to stab the 
fighting front in the back, and that the Army was taking over executive power to maintain 
order."5  In order to do this, "High SS officers, in some places the entire SS, and party 
leaders, were ordered arrested."6  To help them take control, the conspirators planned to 
use the Replacement Army, which included members of "training schools, demonstration 
units, depot troops, and guard battalions."7  This Army was a versatile tool for the 
conspirators because it was interspersed throughout Germany, making it easier to quickly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Helena Schrader, Codename Valkyrie:  General Friedrich Olbricht and the Plot Against 
Hitler (Sparkford, UK:  Haynes Publishing, 2009), 223.	  	  
2Schrader, 186. 	  
3Catherine Epstein, Nazi Germany:  Confronting the Myths (Chichester, UK:  John Wiley 
& Sons, Ltd., 2015), 196. 	  
4Allen Welsh Dulles, Germany's Underground (New York:  The Macmillan Co., 1947), 
184. 	  
5Peter Hoffmann, German Resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 1988), 116.   	  
 6Dulles, 184  
7Constantine FitzGibbon, 20 July (New York:  Norton, 1956), 58. 	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take control of the most important population centers.8  General Erich Fellgiebel, the 
Chief of Signal Troops, would cut off communications between the Wolf's Lair and all 
areas under German control to allow the conspirators time to set up the new government 
without interference from the Nazis.  As Peter Hoffmann, a leading scholar of the 
German resistance, put it, 	  
With the 'Valkyrie' orders and their supplementary instructions the conspirators 
had now created, by perfectly legitimate methods, an instrument with which they 
could, if conditions were right, set in motion all available mobile military forces 
in Germany with the exception of the SS.  The orders were perfectly sensible and 
suitable for an emergency; on the face of it they were neutral and non-political.9  
	  
Unfortunately, Stauffenberg's assassination attempt failed and the coup, set into motion 
too late, did not succeed.  Around midnight on the morning of July 21, Olbricht, 
Stauffenberg, and other prominent conspirators were executed by firing squad, while 
Tresckow committed suicide on the Eastern Front.  	  
Despite the critical roles Tresckow and Olbricht played in the July 20 plot, their 
involvement has largely been glossed over in the secondary literature.  Up until the late 
1970s, their parts in this coup were largely nonexistent as July 20 itself was not a major 
topic.  However, in 1977, Peter Hoffmann published his book The History of the German 
Resistance, 1933-1945, which made July 20 a hallmark of literature on the anti-Hitler 
movement and consequently accorded Tresckow and Olbricht critical positions in its 
planning and implementation.  Hoffmann's narrative set a precedent that has continued 
into the 2000s.  However, this trend has not encompassed all secondary scholarship that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8FitzGibbon, 58-59. 	  
9Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945, trans. Richard 
Barry (Montreal:  McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 305.	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discusses July 20, and many works still delegate Tresckow and Olbricht secondary roles 
to Stauffenberg without acknowledging the crucial parts they played in the conspiracy.  
This paper seeks to give them the amount of attention they rightly deserve for their 
inventive and pivotal influence in regards to the Valkyrie plot, but also accord them an 
appropriate amount of accountability for the failure of the putsch.	  
Born in January 1901 to a Prussian family, Henning von Tresckow came from an 
established line of military officers, making his own entrance into the army 
unsurprising.10  Upon his graduation from the war college in 1936, he joined the German 
General Staff and by the time of Operation Barbarossa in 1941 was the Chief of Staff of 
Army Group Centre, which was composed of two major armies fighting on the Eastern 
Front.11  He had been "raised in a devout Protestant tradition, and he always saw his duty 
to God and country as central to his life."12  Philipp Freiherr von Boeselager, a surviving 
member of the July 20 plot, said of Tresckow's faith, he "was inhabited by an ardent piety 
that he was not afraid to express."13  Like many other officers, whose growing 
dissatisfaction with Hitler and the Nazi regime would prompt them to join the military 
resistance, Tresckow had initially supported Nazism, and was even an enthusiastic 
recruiter for them in the late 1920s,14 before the Third Reich had been established.15  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 265.	  	  
11Ulrich Zwygart, “Integrity and Moral Courage:  Beck, Tresckow and Stauffenberg,” 
Military Review 74, no. 5 (May 1994), accessed March 27, 2015, MasterFILE Premier. 	  
12Schrader, 182. 	  
13Phillipp Freiherr von Boeselager, Valkyrie: The Story of the Plot to Kill Hitler, By It's 
Last Member (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 96. 	  
14Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death:  The Story of the German Resistance (New 
York:  Henry Holt, 1996), 36. 	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fact, Hans Bernd Gisevius, a surviving resistance member, said of Tresckow, "He was for 
many years able to see only the side of National Socialism attractive to a soldier:  the 
assertion of discipline, the reestablishment of military primacy, and the revision of the 
Versailles Treaty."16  This support for Nazism had stemmed from Tresckow's 
dissatisfaction with the Weimar Republic, which had only exacerbated the worsening 
financial crisis Germany was experiencing,17 as well as feelings of anti-Semitism,18 two 
elements that were characteristic of Nazi party members.  Tresckow, welcoming the 
change from the dismal years of the Republic, overlooked the Nazi mistreatment of 
regime opponents, arguing that the achievements of National Socialism, such as the 
regaining of German military independence, far offset the brutality.19  However, as 
Tresckow learned more about the atrocities the Nazis were committing, he began to feel 
that the current government must be deposed.	  
Several key events in the 1930s influenced Tresckow's conversion to the 
opposition.  Like many other officers in the military resistance, he "pointed to the events 
of June 30 and July 1, 1934," during the Night of the Long Knives, as the origin of his 
"break with the Nazis."20  The Night of the Long Knives refers to the violent purge of the 
Nazi storm troopers (SA) during which many members were killed, including their 
leader, Ernst Röhm, due to Hitler's paranoia about their increasing power.  Additionally, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Theodore Hamerow, On the Road to the Wolf’s Lair:  German Resistance to 
Hitler (Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 109.  	  
16Hamerow, 11. 	  
17Hamerow, 31. 	  
18Hamerow, 67. 	  
19Hamerow, 109. 	  
20Fest, 53. 	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the murders of Kurt von Schleicher and Ferdinand von Bredow, two Reichswehr (the 
armed forces of Germany until it was absorbed by the Wehrmacht in the mid-1930s) 
generals, fed his growing disdain for Nazism.21  Aside from this, Tresckow was also 
outraged at the dismissal of Werner von Fritsch, the commander-in-chief of the army, in 
February 1938, after the latter was accused of homosexual activity, and he felt that he and 
his fellow generals should have acted in support of Fritsch in order to help his situation.22  
Later in 1938, when the Nazis conducted a pogrom, known as Kristallnacht, against Jews 
in Germany, Austria, and the recently occupied Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, 
Tresckow said that this "was a personal humiliation and a degradation of civilization."23   	  
By 1939 when Hitler invaded Poland, Tresckow remarked, "War is madness.  We 
have to prevent it.  The key person is Hitler.  We have to kill him."24  In light of this 
comment, it is clear that Tresckow was already an active member in the military 
resistance by the late 1930s/early 1940s, and the harsh treatment of Jews in the Soviet 
Union during the Nazi invasion from 1941-1942,25 as well as the issuing of the 
Commissar and additional harsh orders,26 solidified his motivations.  The Commissar 
Order called for "guerillas and Soviet political agents" to be shot immediately.27  
However, Tresckow did much to resist it, as Fabian von Schlabrendorff, his adjutant, 
stated in his memoir The Secret War Against Hitler (1965): 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21Schrader, 184. 	  
22Zwygart. 	  
23Zwygart. 	  
24Zwygart. 	  
25Michael Balfour, Withstanding Hitler in Germany, 1933-1945 (London:  Routledge, 
1988), 32. 	  
26Balfour, 32. 	  
27Zwygart. 	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Tresckow had...decided to ignore Hitler's order to murder any Russian 
commissars who were taken prisoner; he also made it a point to treat other 
Russian prisoners decently.  I still remember the day the first Russian general was 
taken prisoner by our Army Group.  The poor man, who evidently thought his last 
hour had come, was visibly bewildered to find that he was accorded every 
courtesy, even to receiving a German general's ration of food, liquor, and 
cigarettes.28 
	  
Although there were many things that turned Tresckow against National Socialism from 
the mid-1930s to the early 1940s, the primary reason he himself gave for his opposition 
to Hitler, especially his efforts to kill him, was "the extermination of 'tens of thousands of 
Jews' in the 'most horrible way.'"29  	  
Unlike Tresckow, General Friedrich Olbricht had quite a different path to the 
military resistance.  Tresckow and Olbricht began communicating with each other in 
1941, with the March 13, 1943, assassination attempt being the main resistance effort 
they worked on together before July 20, 1944.30  Friedrich Olbricht was born in the 
Kingdom of Saxony in October of 1888, which made him about twelve years Tresckow's 
senior.31  Unlike Tresckow's family, Olbricht's included many educators, making his 
entrance into the military unpredictable, but understandable because he joined in 1907 
when "the military was 'the pride of the nation.'"32  As a young soldier, Olbricht fought in 
World War I33 and became a supporter of the Weimar Republic that was subsequently 
established in Germany after the war ended, making him "one of the few officers who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon 
(Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1965), 137. 	  
29Hamerow, 316. 	  
30Anton Gill, A Honourable Defeat:  A History Of German Resistance To Hitler, 1933-
1945, 1st American ed. (New York:  H. Holt, 1994), 206. 	  
31Schrader, 24. 	  
32Schrader, 26. 	  
33Schrader, 30. 	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was happy to serve the Republic...with inner conviction."34  However, the Great 
Depression plunged Germany into a sea of economic woes, weakening support for the 
Republic and increasing that of the Nazis, eventually resulting in Hitler's appointment as 
Chancellor in January 1933 and the National Socialist seizure of power.  Nonetheless, 
Olbricht did not support Hitler's appointment and "was 'outraged, that such a dilettante 
with such an unsavoury past could become chancellor of the German Reich.'"35  
However, Olbricht's disdain for Hitler seemed to exist even in the 1920s, especially due 
to the first coup attempt made by the future dictator known as the Beer Hall Putsch 
(1923) and his reading of Hitler’s Mein Kampf (1925).36  Even though he already 
harbored a disdain for Hitler and the Nazi Party, Olbricht's views of them were still 
soured by the Night of the Long Knives37 and the Fritsch Crisis in the 1930s, just like 
Tresckow's.38  A further motivating factor that Olbricht and Tresckow shared was their 
desire to alter the military command system set up by Hitler, which gave the Führer 
"direct authority down to divisional, even company, level."39  Understandably, this 
system of command seemed inefficient and many military officers sought to change it so 
that the structure would also reflect a smaller, local level.40  Like many other members of 
the military resistance, Olbricht too was outraged by the Nazi mistreatment of Jews.  
Overall, "Olbricht was primarily motivated by religious and patriotic considerations but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34Schrader, 66. 	  
35Schrader, 81. 	  
36Schrader, 82. 	  
37Schrader, 90. 	  
38Schrader, 105. 	  
39Eberhard Zeller, The Flame of Freedom:  The German Struggle Against Hitler, trans. 
R.P. Heller and D.R. Masters (Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1994), 155. 	  
40Zeller, 156. 	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also by the profound distaste of a cultivated man for the primitiveness of the Nazis and 
their moral unscrupulousness."41  His attitudes towards Hitler and National Socialism 
eventually led him to formally become a part of the military resistance. 	  
In late 1939, General Ludwig Beck, the Army Chief of Staff forced out in 1938, 
had put together a list of military officers, which included Olbricht, who may have been 
willing to take part in the resistance,42 and by 1941, Olbricht had become an active 
member.  In late September 1941, Tresckow sent Fabian von Schlabrendorff to Berlin to 
talk with Beck, stating that if he and his fellow conspirators were willing to stage a coup, 
Army Group Centre would carry out the assassination.43  Fatefully, Beck "put 
Schlabrendorff (and so Tresckow's entire group) in touch with Olbricht."44  By the winter 
of 1941-1942, "concrete coup plans started to be formed under the codename 
"Valkyrie"45 and in the winter of 1942-1943, Olbricht began working with Tresckow on a 
conspiracy to assassinate Hitler, culminating in the brandy bottle attempt on March 13, 
1943.46  After this failure, the next big conspiracy coalesced and executed an attempt on 
July 20, 1944.  Since January 1940, Olbricht had been the head of the General Army 
Office, which "was one of three major departments subordinate to the Home 
[Replacement] Army commander...[and it] was the most important of the three, its 
principal function being the supply of trained replacements to the German armies in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41Fest, 188. 	  
42Harold Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War 
(Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1968), 202-203. 	  
43Fest, 181.	  
44Schrader, 185. 	  	  	  	  
 45Schrader, 186.  
46Gill, 206. 	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field."47  Given his position, Olbricht had every incentive to alter Valkyrie so that the 
Replacement Army would play a crucial role and therefore the conspiracy would be able 
to seize power.  Olbricht actually recruited Stauffenberg, the assassin on July 20 who is 
often hailed as the most important figure of the putsch, to the resistance in the spring of 
1943, and the Colonel was his chief of staff at the General Army Office.	  
Henning von Tresckow and Friedrich Olbricht both became involved in the 
military resistance much earlier than Stauffenberg, who did not join until the early 1940s 
after being recruited by Olbricht.  Stauffenberg declined to join the resistance in 1941 
because he believed Germany should focus on winning World War II before worrying 
about changing the government.  Furthermore, he "remained reluctant to enter the 
resistance until the defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht on the eastern front persuaded him 
that the war was or at least might be unwinnable."48  However, Tresckow and Olbricht 
had gained considerable experience since their entry into the resistance up until the time 
of the July 20 plot in 1944, and so were able to contribute significantly to the coup for 
four primary reasons.  Firstly, Tresckow had planned and executed prior assassination 
attempts, most notably that of March 13, 1943.  This was important because he was able 
to learn from his failures and apply the lessons he learned to July 20 so optimal 
conditions could be created to successfully kill Hitler.  Secondly, from their previous 
assassination efforts, Tresckow and Fabian von Schlabrendorff had procured and tested 
the type of bomb Stauffenberg would later use.  Thirdly, in planning assassination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47FitzGibbon, 62. 	  
48Hamerow, 285.	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attempts, Tresckow realized that in order to make Hitler's death meaningful, he needed a 
way to topple the Nazi government, so he teamed up with Olbricht, who had spent time 
working with Operation Valkyrie.  Olbricht had gotten the idea in the early 1940s49 to use 
the Valkyrie orders to stage a military coup after Hitler’s demise,50 which was the basis 
and ultimate goal of the July 20 plot.  He revised Valkyrie several times, as Tresckow 
would do later on with Stauffenberg's help.  Lastly, because they had both joined the 
resistance well before 1944, Tresckow and Olbricht had formed contacts with other key 
resistors, from which they were able to create a vast network of support on July 20.   	  
Tresckow's prior attempts to assassinate Hitler up until July 20, 1944, alerted him 
to several key logistics he needed to keep in mind if the dictator were to be successfully 
eliminated.  The lessons he learned manifested themselves on July 20, demonstrating the 
considerable influence they had on this latest assassination effort.  Since the late summer 
of 1941, Tresckow had been making plans to assassinate the Führer, with his vigorous 
action spurred by the issuing of the Commissar Order.51  His chance came on August 4, 
1941,52 when Hitler visited Army Group Centre to conference with Field Marshal Fedor 
von Bock.53  Von Bock was strongly opposed to a recent order for troops in Russia to be 
transferred away from Moscow, so Hitler deemed it necessary to personally deliver his 
instructions to him.  When Tresckow and Schlabrendorff heard of Hitler's upcoming visit, 
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they embraced the opportunity to assassinate him, and planned to shoot him upon his 
entrance to the Army Group's headquarters.54  Ultimately, this attempt was not carried out 
because the amount of security surrounding Hitler alerted Tresckow to several tweaks he 
needed to make.55  By the next serious attempts in March of 1943, Tresckow's plans had 
become more nuanced and sophisticated. 	  
Perhaps the most famous attempt on Hitler's life aside from that on July 20 was 
Tresckow's brandy bottle plan on March 13, 1943.  During the time leading up to March 
13, Tresckow had managed to entice Hitler to visit the Army Group Centre headquarters 
near Smolensk in Russia to meet with Field Marshal Günther von Kluge.56  Von Kluge 
apparently opposed Operation Citadel, "the attack on the Kursk salient."57  Tresckow had 
tried so insistently to get Hitler to Russia because he believed that it would be easier to 
make an attempt on the Führer's life at Army Group Centre headquarters, rather than 
sending an assassin to "his impregnable headquarters called the Wolf's Lair 
(Wolfsschanze)" in East Prussia.58  By luring Hitler to Russia, the conspirators would gain 
the upper hand as Hitler and his security guards would not know every detail of the 
surroundings.  	  
Learning from his previous assassination attempt in the late summer of 1941, 
Tresckow and his fellow conspirators planned and replanned their course of action.  The 
most important thing to be taken into consideration was how difficult it would be to gain 
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direct access to Hitler, as the dictator's security detail in 1941 had demonstrated.  After 
taking this into consideration, Tresckow formulated three possible assassination scenarios 
for Hitler's impending visit to the Army Group, with only one actually carried out.  
However, the two discarded options would inform subsequent planning for July 20, as it 
became clear that they were not feasible. 	  
Tresckow's first thought was to have Lieutenant-Colonel Georg von Boeselager, 
at the time the commander of the "Boeselager" cavalry unit within Army Group Centre,59 
and later the commander of the Cavalry Regiment Centre,60 create a group of anti-Nazi 
officers that would kill Hitler during his trip from the airport through the woods to Army 
Group Centre.61  Tresckow decided not to choose this plan because Hitler had not 
followed the original route from the airport, meaning that Boeselager's men would not be 
in the correct location to shoot him, and also because this strategy would place the blame 
squarely on the Army, as it would be obvious to the surviving Nazis who killed the 
Führer.62  The second option Tresckow devised was to send an assassin in to shoot Hitler 
while he was dining at the Army Group, but the shooting would have to begin as soon as 
the doors were opened to the lunchroom, meaning that precision would be sacrificed, 
leading to unnecessary casualties.63  Also, this method would be incriminating, like the 
first, because it would be obvious who the assassin was.  Furthermore, Hitler would have 
to be shot in the face because he wore a bullet-proof vest underneath his uniform and his 
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cap was metal-lined, further decreasing the possibility of success as the shooter, who did 
not have the benefit of precision, would likely have missed the vulnerable areas on the 
target.64  These three reasons led Tresckow to abandon the second option before finally 
settling on the third, in which he employed a bomb to detonate during Hitler's return 
flight after he left Army Group Centre. 	  
Before Hitler had arrived on March 13, Tresckow had taken great consideration 
into the nature of his Condor aircraft, knowing that the section Hitler sat in was heavily 
armored and could be detached from the rest of the plane and parachuted to safety in the 
case of an emergency, making it vital to blow up this part.65  Tresckow was able to obtain 
drawings of the plane as well as security information from Captain Ludwig Gehre, a 
conspiracy member in Berlin, so he would know exactly where the bomb should be 
placed.66  For the explosion, Tresckow procured a compact and silent explosive, a task he 
had assigned to Colonel Rudolf-Christoph Baron von Gersdorff, the Intelligence Officer 
at Army Group Centre.67  The morning of March 13, Tresckow had gone to meet Hitler at 
his landing site, and noticed firstly that he and his entourage had arrived in two identical 
planes, meaning that if the bomb were to be planted, the conspirators had to make sure 
they chose the right plane; secondly, there were a large number of security guards 
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accompanying Hitler, so they had to be discreet in smuggling the bomb onto the 
aircraft.68	  
Fabian von Schlabrendorff gave a detailed account of March 13, stating "During 
the luncheon, Tresckow approached Colonel Heinz Brandt, a member of Hitler's 
entourage, and asked him casually whether he would be good enough to take along a 
small parcel containing two bottles of brandy for General Helmuth Stieff of the High 
Command at Headquarters.  Brandt readily agreed."69  After the lunch, Tresckow and 
Schlabrendorff accompanied Hitler to the airport for his flight back to Rastenberg.70  
While in the car, Schlabrendorff prepared the bombs so that they would detonate within 
thirty minutes and bring Hitler's plane down around Minsk, and put them in the brandy 
bottles.  When he had finished, he handed these bottles to Colonel Brandt.  After learning 
the bomb had not gone off on the plane, Schlabrendorff flew to Hitler's headquarters in 
Rastenberg to retrieve the package, knowing that if it was discovered there was a bomb 
inside, it would be a death sentence for himself and all his fellow conspirators on the 
Eastern Front.71  He replaced the two old bottles of brandy with new ones, explaining that 
the date on the originals had been incorrect72 and Brandt gave him the two original 
bottles.73  After he had retrieved the bottles, he opened them in his personal sleeping 
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compartment on the train while he was en route to Berlin,74 and "discovered that the 
bomb had been properly set, the little capsule containing the acid had been broken, the 
acid had eaten through the wire, and the firing pin had shot forward.  But the percussion 
cap had not gone off."75  This failure of explosion was attributed to too low of a 
temperature during the flight.76  After retrieving the bomb, Schlabrendorff passed it off to 
Gersdorff, who had offered to make the next attempt on Hitler's life.77   	  
 Baron von Gersdorff was supposed to be on duty at a ceremony in the Zeughaus 
in Berlin, where Hitler was going to see a collection of captured Russian weapons on 
display, as well as attend a ceremony for German soldiers killed in combat.78  Gersdorff 
had a good reason for being present at the exhibition because he worked for the 
Intelligence section of Army Group Centre, which was responsible for organizing the 
event.79  After Tresckow had approved of Gersdorff's offer to blow himself up with 
Hitler, Schlabrendorff visited the Baron at the Hotel Eden to deliver the bomb80 in the 
middle of the night on March 20-21.81  Gersdorff prepared the bomb, which was 
supposed to detonate as soon as fifteen minutes after being activated while he was taking 
Hitler through the exhibition, however, Hitler did not spend as much time looking at the 
weapons as was needed for the bomb to explode.  After Hitler left, Gersdorff rushed to 
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the nearest restroom where he removed the bomb from his coat pocket82 and tore the fuse 
off before it detonated.  Although two failures in such a short amount of time were 
nonetheless devastating to Tresckow, he learned valuable lessons that he applied to the 
July 20 attempt.                                                      	  
Tresckow learned from both his actual assassination attempts, such as that on 
March 13 and March 21, as well as from the planning he did for attempts that were not 
carried out, like in the summer of 1941 and the two unused options from March 13.  
Overall, he learned four important lessons that he would apply to July 20 so that this try 
would have the greatest chance to accomplish the goal of eliminating Hitler.  Firstly, 
Tresckow learned that an assassination attempt should ideally be made when the war was 
not going in Germany's favor.  The conspirators involved in the late summer of 1941 had 
competing responsibilities between fighting Hitler's war and planning their resistance 
activities.83  Furthermore, because the German army was successful during this time, it 
served to demoralize the military resistance and lessen the incentive of soldiers and 
officers to offer support to the opposition.84  However, in March 1943, the tide of the war 
had turned against Germany, meaning that greater support emerged for the resistance.  
This increased support led to a more organized assassination effort, as Tresckow had the 
resources to prepare three options for Hitler's visit to Army Group Centre.  The second 
lesson Tresckow learned was that the assassin needed direct access to Hitler, as he was 
alarmed at the security precautions taken by the Führer's entourage.  By the end of 1941, 
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there had already been a number of attempts on Hitler's life, which led to a tightening of 
security, and by 1943, the detail had become even more extensive.85  	  
Thirdly, Tresckow learned that the assassination attempt needed to take place in 
Hitler's own headquarters where his movements would be more predictable and he would 
not be as paranoid about security.  Tresckow had needed to abandon his first option on 
March 13, shooting Hitler during his trip from the airfield to Army Group Centre, 
because the route had changed at the last minute as a security precaution due to Hitler's 
paranoia.  If Tresckow could catch Hitler in his own headquarters, he would be more 
relaxed as he was assured his security personnel knew the area well and could not be 
caught off guard.  The fourth and final lesson was that the method of assassination must 
not be shooting, and that a bomb was a better option.  Due to the tight security around 
Hitler as well as the protective clothing he wore (his bullet proof vest and metal-lined 
cap), the chances of hitting him with a bullet were slim, so a different technique must be 
employed.  Furthermore, shooting Hitler would make it very obvious who the assassin 
was and incriminate the Army, while the use of a bomb would be relatively anonymous.  
These four lessons would inform Tresckow's subsequent planning and tries on Hitler's 
life, as he continued to tweak the blueprint up until July 20, 1944. 	  
Ultimately, the July 20 plot reflected all four lessons Tresckow had learned.  
Firstly, at the time of Stauffenberg's attempt, the war was not going in Germany's favor.  
By July 1944, it was clear that Germany had already lost the war to the Allies, as they 
were fighting on three fronts, had deployed weak fighting divisions that could not stand 
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up to the immense reserves of supplies and troops the enemy possessed, and the 
Luftwaffe was powerless to stop the allied bombings.86  Secondly, when Olbricht 
suggested that Stauffenberg be the one to plant the bomb, Tresckow quickly approved, 
realizing that with Stauffenberg's new position he had direct access to Hitler and 
therefore a good chance of successfully assassinating him.87  Stauffenberg had access 
because on June 20, 1944, he was appointed Chief of Staff to the commander of the 
Replacement Army, Colonel-General Fromm,88 meaning that he occasionally 
accompanied his superior to briefings with Hitler, and was even sometimes summoned 
himself by the Führer.  Thirdly and fourthly (respectively), the attempt took place in 
Hitler's own headquarters, the Wolf's Lair in East Prussia, and it was made with a bomb, 
rather than a machine gun.  The bomb that was used provides the second reason why 
Tresckow and Olbricht were the primary masterminds behind the July 20 plot:  they were 
responsible for procuring, testing, and storing the bomb Stauffenberg used in his attempt. 	  
From his previous assassination experiences, especially the March 13 attempt, 
Tresckow had gained extensive knowledge of bombs, and even procured and tested the 
type that was used on July 20.  He first started experimenting with bombs in the summer 
of 1942 when he asked Gersdorff, who had planned to carry out the March 21 museum 
assassination, to obtain access to explosives and fuses for an upcoming attempt on 
Hitler's life.  Gersdorff provided dozens of various types of explosives, and Tresckow and 
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Schlabrendorff set about testing them.89  One type Gersdorff gave them was a small 
plastic explosive that had been captured from the British90 and was like those that had 
been dropped throughout Europe by the RAF to assist the anti-Nazi movement in 
German-occupied areas.91  Tresckow chose to use the British bomb and fuses for various 
reasons, but, like those produced in Germany, the British model had its advantages and 
drawbacks.  Firstly, the British bomb, referred to as the "clam," was about the size of a 
small pocket book and so able to be easily concealed.92  Secondly, the British fuses were 
far more silent than German ones.93  Although German fuses could cause the bomb to 
detonate much more quickly than their British counterparts, they made a hissing noise 
that betrayed the bomb's presence.94  Finally, Tresckow chose the British model because 
of the ability to set the fuse for a specific amount of time, with detonation time 
determined by the temperature.95  After spending additional time testing this model with 
Schlabrendorff, Tresckow was further convinced that it was the right option for his 
purposes. 	  
Fabian von Schlabrendorff gave a detailed account in his memoir of the 
procurement and testing of the British explosive with Tresckow, which they did near the 
Dnieper River in Smolensk, Russia.96  Schlabrendorff reiterated the benefits of the British 
model mentioned above, and stated that it had two great advantages:  it could inflict a 
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very powerful blow without being bulky itself, and the fuse had different timing 
mechanisms to choose from, meaning that the conspirators could select the one that best 
suited their needs.97  These timing mechanisms were calculated using a fixed temperature 
of sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit, and included a chart for predicted detonation times in 
different temperatures, which Tresckow decided to ignore and instead created his own 
chart based upon the tests he conducted with Schlabrendorff.98  Most of the tests that the 
two performed worked out as expected, but some of them did not and the bomb exploded 
later than they had anticipated.99  But, they did not possess the knowledge to determine 
what had gone wrong.100  Therefore, they casually asked explosives experts to explain the 
mishap, and through these conversations learned that the cold slowed down the 
detonation process.101  Although the tests did provide useful information, the testing had 
its limitations.  For example, although Tresckow and Schlabrendorff knew that a confined 
area would greatly magnify the blast, they did not know how powerful it would be nor 
how many bombs would be necessary, so in planning assassination attempts, especially 
those in March of 1943, they always planned to use more than one bomb.102  Tresckow 
got his opportunity to use the bomb on March 13 after Hitler's visit to Army Group 
Centre, and the brandy bottles Schlabrendorff handed to Colonel Brandt contained the 
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tested explosives. Additionally, these bottles "contained the same type of bomb 
Stauffenberg used more than a year later."103  	  
When Stauffenberg entered the military conspiracy in September of 1943, 
Tresckow again procured British explosives, and delivered them to Berlin.104  In January 
of 1944, Schlabrendorff hosted a meeting at his Berlin flat, which Tresckow, 
Stauffenberg, Gersdorff, and Freytag-Loringhoven (the head of Branch II of the Abwehr, 
a German military intelligence organization, where Gersdorff had originally obtained the 
British model) attended.105  At this meeting, the procurement of more explosives was 
discussed, as well as prior experiences with the assassination methods they had tried to 
use, of which Tresckow had considerable knowledge.106  In selecting the explosive, 
"Stauffenberg relied on the experience gained with these bombs in British Commando 
raids...[and] on the numerous tests Tresckow had made."107  When the bomb had been 
selected, Olbricht entrusted its safekeeping to Lieutenant-Colonel Fritz von der Lancken, 
whom he knew personally.108  Von der Lancken lived in Potsdam and for each of 
Stauffenberg's attempts in July of 1944, on the 6th, 11th, 15th, and the 20th, they were 
retrieved from this location.109  	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Effective use of the bomb to kill Hitler, however, would only eliminate the head 
of the Nazi regime, and Tresckow realized, as early as 1941, that to bring the entire 
government down, a plan for a seizure of power needed to be organized as well.  To 
achieve this, he turned to General Friedrich Olbricht, whose work with Operation 
Valkyrie provided just the solution to his dilemma, and supplies another reason why 
Tresckow and Olbricht were the main architects of the July 20 plot.  Olbricht had been 
thinking about how to use Valkyrie to allow a coup since shortly after the commencement 
of Operation Barbarossa in mid-1941.110  During this time, he realized that it would 
provide the ideal means to stage a coup.111  In late September 1941, Tresckow sent 
Schlabrendorff to Berlin to talk with General Ludwig Beck, stating that if he and his 
fellow conspirators were willing to stage a coup, Army Group Centre would carry out the 
assassination.112  Fatefully, Beck "put Schlabrendorff (and so Tresckow's entire group) in 
touch with Olbricht"113 who "conceived and worked out the first serious plans for seizing 
power at home."114  In the winter of 1941-1942, Olbricht realized that if Valkyrie were 
rewritten to deal with internal unrest, especially an uprising by slave laborers, then this 
would create the ideal conditions for a military coup.115  After telling Admiral Wilhelm 
Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, his thoughts, "Canaris used his position...to persuade 
Hitler that there was a (completely fictitious) risk of a forced-labourer uprising.  The 
paranoid dictator obligingly ordered one of his bitterest domestic enemies to start making 
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plans that could, and would, be used as a blueprint for a coup against him."116  Canaris 
also convinced Hitler that the Replacement Army should carry out Valkyrie.117  Because 
Olbricht worked in the General Army Office under the commander of this Army, General 
Friedrich Fromm, this gave the conspiracy an advantageous position.	  
By March of 1942, "the first 'shadow government,' or post-Hitler government, 
was drawn up on paper, and drafts of radio announcements and so on started to circulate 
among the conspirators."118  In the late autumn of 1942, Olbricht and Tresckow began to 
seriously discuss employing Valkyrie, as this plan would provide a "body of armed 
troops [the Replacement Army] without which they could not hope to carry out their coup 
d'état."119  However, these plans would be shelved for a time because drumming up 
support became more difficult throughout 1942 as the German army found success in the 
Russian campaign.120  However, "the winter of 1942-1943 brought the anticipated reverse 
in Germany's military fortunes" and "at once the anti-Nazi conspirators in the military 
intensified their activities," seeing an opportunity to capitalize on the dismay many 
German soldiers felt towards Hitler.121  	  
By early 1943 Valkyrie was ready to put into action.  In February, Olbricht had 
Schlabrendorff relay a message to Tresckow in which he said, "We are ready.  The 
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"ignition" can be turned on."122  Olbricht had been working in Berlin handling the 
logistics of seizing power in the capital of the Third Reich.123  He had set about assigning 
fellow officers to secure key locations in Berlin and kill Nazi leaders who would 
undoubtedly try to sabotage the coup.124  With the plans set in place to establish a new 
government, the only task that remained was to eliminate Hitler, which Tresckow 
attempted to do on March 13 and 21, 1943.  As there would be on July 20, 1944, there 
was communication on March 13 between the assassin and Olbricht so the latter would 
know when to initiate Valkryie.  Schlabrendorff contacted Olbricht in Berlin to give him 
the first codeword, "Flash," saying that the assassination would be taking place shortly, 
and spoke with him again when Hitler's plane had taken off.125    	  
Although the assassination attempts in March 1943 were not successful and 
Olbricht did not have the chance to initiate Valkyrie, his further analyses during this time 
alerted him to several things that needed to be corrected before it could be set in motion, 
making it a blessing in disguise that both attempts were unsuccessful, as the conspirators 
did not yet have a complete way to grasp power after Hitler had been killed.126  In July of 
1943, after the failed March attempts, Hitler approved the supplement to Valkyrie that 
Olbricht had added.  While the original iteration of the Operation, ""Valkyrie I" 
designated a strategy to ensure the combat readiness of all units..."Valkyrie II" provided 
for their "swiftest possible assemblage" into "battle groups ready for action" so that the 
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coup would progress at a faster rate.127  Tresckow was able to take a few months' sick 
leave in order to help Olbricht make these changes.128  Even after these alterations, 
Olbricht and his fellow conspirators, including Tresckow and Stauffenberg, continued to 
make more adaptations to the plans as the course of the war shifted and the infrastructure 
in Germany changed.129   	  
In September of 1943, Tresckow was able to take leave again from the Eastern 
Front to go to Berlin and work on polishing the Valkyrie orders with Stauffenberg.130  
When Tresckow had been transferred to the Eastern Front, he left Stauffenberg with the 
responsibility of executing Valkyrie, demonstrating that the latter simply stepped into the 
framework established by Tresckow and Olbricht.131  In early September 1943, Tresckow 
and Stauffenberg began revising again Olbricht's Valkyrie plans.  They added a new 
opening statement, which read: ""The Führer Adolf Hitler is dead!  A treacherous group 
of party leaders has attempted to exploit the situation by attacking our embattled soldiers 
from the rear in order to seize power for themselves!"  The Reich government, the 
announcement continued, had "declared martial law in order to maintain law and 
order."132  Tresckow and Stauffenberg created a large hoax that blamed the Nazi Party for 
internal unrest and a coup, when in reality it was the Valkyrie conspirators who would be 
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seizing power.133  Thus, apparently legal action would be used for the purposes of the 
coup d'état," which were typed out by Frau von Tresckow and her friend Fräulein von 
Oven.134  Although the revised Valkyrie plans were important, Tresckow and Olbricht 
realized they needed a solid base of supporters in order to help them execute it, and their 
recruitment of crucial figures to the July 20 plot provides the final reason they were the 
main creators of the putsch.                 	  
The fourth advantage Tresckow and Olbricht had gained from being seasoned 
members of the military resistance was a complex web of contacts with other opponents 
of Nazism.  The July 20 plot brought together different resistance sectors, such as the 
conservatives led by Carl Goerdeler and Ludwig Beck after he resigned as army chief of 
staff, and the military, within which there were several mini groups of resistors, like that 
surrounding Admiral Wilhelm Canaris in the Abwehr.135  Aside from these more 
established circles, Tresckow and Olbricht also made contact with members of the police 
apparatus in Germany.  The July 20 plot required resistors from these different sectors 
because it was not only about killing Hitler and taking over the government (which the 
military and police largely handled), but also about making peace with the Allies and 
ending World War II, which would have been the responsibility of diplomats from the 
conservative sector.  Tresckow and Olbricht had contacts with many people in both these 
areas, although it is impossible to provide a comprehensive list.  However, their contacts 
and recruitments that were given the most influential roles to play on July 20 were Carl 
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Goerdeler, General Erich Fellgiebel, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, Admiral Wilhelm 
Canaris, and Arthur Nebe.  Because "Each new initiate learned the names of only a few 
of the other conspirators," Stauffenberg had to rely on Tresckow and Olbricht to widen 
his contact base.136  Olbricht's rooms in the Army Headquarters Office in Berlin were 
often used to hold conspiracy meetings, although due to the danger of being caught by the 
Gestapo, meetings did not occur with extreme frequency.137  Nonetheless, Tresckow and 
Olbricht managed to create a network of colleagues that would prove useful when 
Stauffenberg made his assassination attempt.       	  
In the conservative sector, the main member Tresckow and Olbricht had contact 
with was Carl Goerdeler.  Goerdeler yearned for the days of monarchy and after seeing 
the disorderly conduct of the Reichstag during the Weimar Republic, he had adopted the 
conservative view of "strict majority (not proportional) representation and more power 
for the executive."138  Nevertheless, Goerdeler, who possessed a PhD in law as well as 
satisfied the qualifications for becoming a lawyer, was offered the position of economics 
or foreign minister in Chancellor von Papen's cabinet in the last days of the Republic.139  
After leaving politics, he became an opponent of National Socialism and traveled around 
Europe where he sought to establish contacts for the anti-Nazi movement.  It was during 
this time, in the late 1930s, that he and Olbricht first met140 and in the winter of 1941-
1942, "the 'political wing' of the conspiracy [which included Goerdeler]...started to look 
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at the political requirements of a coup."141  Fabian von Schlabrendorff established official 
contact between Goerdeler, and the military resistance in the summer of 1942,142 with a 
meeting occurring between Tresckow, Olbricht, and Goerdeler at the end of the year.143  
Their communication intensified in the late summer of 1943, when it became clear that 
using Valkyrie was inevitable.144  Goerdeler presented his Peace Plan to the generals, 
which included the formation of a civilian government, the cessation of Nazi atrocities, 
the liberation of European nations from German control, and a return to true obedience of 
the law and general education,145 as he would play a part in handling the political 
negotiations with the Allies after the putsch had been successful.146  Tresckow kept in 
constant communication with Goerdeler about the political objectives of the coup d'etat, 
knowing that civilians played a crucial role in the plan, as it could potentially be 
dangerous if the Army was given too much political power.147  Goerdeler was to occupy a 
prominent position in the putsch government, most likely Chancellor,148 and therefore 
would be vital in attempting negotiations with the Allies.149  He first met Stauffenberg 
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when the latter joined the coup preparations in the summer of 1943, and the two often 
met to discuss plans.150      	  
Tresckow and Olbricht had also managed to build up a base of contacts within the 
military.  Tresckow recruited General Erich Fellgiebel, the Chief of Communications and 
an ardent opponent of Nazism since before the war.151  Fellgiebel had been involved in 
previous assassination attempts, such as that on March 13, 1943,152 and he was assigned 
two crucial roles on July 20, 1944,153 which brought him into close collaboration with 
Olbricht.154  Firstly, Fellgiebel was supposed to sever all communications coming from 
Hitler or his entourage after Stauffenberg's bomb exploded in the Wolf's Lair.155  There 
were four main means of communications available at Hitler's headquarters, and included 
the telephone, teleprinter, radio (capable of transmitting both speech and Morse code), 
and a courier service (both land and air).156  The lack of connection Fellgiebel was 
supposed to create would allow the conspirators in Berlin sufficient time to take over the 
government without interference from the Nazis.  Fellgiebel's second task was to keep the 
communications flowing from Olbricht's office to other offices involved in the coup.157  
This second task was achieved so well that the coup was nicknamed the "Switchboard 
Putsch."158  However, Fellgiebel's overarching objective was to "gain control of the 
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Wehrmacht and the apparatus of military command as quickly and smoothly as possible" 
so that the newly established government would be able to bring an end to the war and 
order troop withdrawals from both the western and eastern fronts.159  Bringing a swift end 
to the war would fall on the shoulders of Field Marshal Günther von Kluge.	  
Field Marshal von Kluge, who was appointed the commander of Army Group 
Centre in the winter of 1941, was one of the most important figures that Tresckow had 
managed to recruit.160  He was somewhat sympathetic to the resistance,161 and this gave 
the conspirators hope because Tresckow realized that if a coup was to be successful, it 
needed to include a high-ranking and well-known military commander.162  Tresckow was 
Kluge's Chief of Staff at the Army Group, and persuaded him that Hitler needed to be 
eliminated.163  Tresckow fought a back-and-forth battle with Kluge, as the latter often 
vacillated between support for Hitler and support for the resistance.164  In one of his 
efforts to win Kluge over, Tresckow persuaded him to host Carl Goerdeler, another key 
contact discussed above, and a man who was always clear about his disdain for Nazism, 
in late 1942 at Army Group Centre to discuss resistance plans, but this was 
unsuccessful.165  After this visit, Tresckow continued to apply constant pressure on 
Kluge.  Fabian von Schlabrendorff "teasingly dubbed Tresckow 'the watchmaker' because 
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Kluge had to be wound up each day until his resolution [to join the conspiracy] had 
reached the pitch that Tresckow had inculcated in him the night before."166  	  
Through the summer of 1943, Kluge was very supportive of the conspirators, 
although he never acted on his own, only when Tresckow urged him.167  On March 13, 
1943, the date of Tresckow's brandy bottle assassination attempt, Kluge said to him, 
"count me in."168  In July 1944, Kluge was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the west, 
putting him in an advantageous position for the conspiracy.  Later in the month on July 
12, Kluge had aligned more with the military resistance, and when Tresckow sent 
Colonel Georg Freiherr von Boeselager to visit him, he said that he would be ready to 
support the conspiracy after they had eliminated Hitler; "On July 20 Kluge kept precisely 
to the limits of this agreement."169  Tresckow wanted Kluge to support the conspiracy by 
allowing the Allies to break through his lines,170 after which he could negotiate an 
armistice, as he was an Army Group commander and a field marshal, and so wielded the 
authority to do so.171           	  
Conspirators were also found in the Abwehr, the army's military intelligence 
branch.  Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of the Abwehr, and Hans Oster, Canaris's 
assistant,172 became connected with Tresckow in 1941.173  Canaris had worked on 
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revising Operation Valkyrie with Olbricht in 1941-1942 so the conspirators could use it 
to seize power, as mentioned above.174  Furthermore, conspirators like Tresckow and 
Olbricht, who were more involved in the logistical planning of the plot, depended upon 
Canaris to keep them informed about the Gestapo and protect them from it so they could 
proceed with planning for July 20 as smoothly as possible.175  Fabian von Schlabrendorff 
stated in his memoir, "Without the protective shield furnished by such men as 
Canaris...the German opposition would never have survived, or had a chance to develop 
right under the noses of the Gestapo."176  For example, Schlabrendorff recalls a comment 
made by Olbricht in which he said, "Admiral Canaris came to see me [in late 1943, early 
1944] and told me of a conversation with Himmler.  Himmler said quite bluntly that he 
knew very well that influential circles within the Army were hatching plans for a 
rebellion."177  Therefore, without Canaris, the conspiracy very likely would have been 
discovered before July 20.	  
Aside from the established conservative and military resistance sectors, Olbricht 
was also able to convince Arthur Nebe, a member of the police apparatus in Nazi 
Germany, to join the July 20 coup effort.178  A true asset to the anti-Hitler movement, 
Nebe was able to pass himself off as a dedicated SS officer while quietly and 
intentionally sabotaging the orders he received from Heinrich Himmler after the SS 
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absorbed the police after 1933.179  In the lead up to July 20, Fabian von Schlabrendorff 
was tasked with keeping in contact with Nebe, who was able to obtain information on 
Himmler and other high-ranking Gestapo officials so that the conspirators could avoid 
getting caught and executed.180  On July 13, 1944, a week before the attempted 
assassination, Nebe arrived at Olbricht's office to receive the plans for police actions on 
the twentieth, and was given maps of Berlin so that they would know which parts of the 
city to occupy.181  On July 20, the police were to set up barriers around "the Berlin 
circular autobahn."182  Nebe himself was to be in charge of thirty raiding parties that 
would arrest the most important Nazi "functionaries and dignitaries."183  Furthermore, 
Nebe was also influential in procuring the correct type of explosive for use on July 20, 
and discovered that ten pounds of explosives was adequate to create a high powered 
blast, but that four pounds was useless, giving the conspirators a range to think about.184     	  
Due to the fact that Tresckow and Olbricht were the primary masterminds behind 
July 20, they do deserve a significant portion of the blame for the plot's failure for two 
reasons.  Firstly, Operation Valkyrie itself and its execution were flawed, and the plan 
was not put into motion in a timely manner after the bomb exploded on July 20.  This 
first failure largely falls on Olbricht's shoulders, as he was mostly responsible for the 
revisions of Valkyrie so it would permit a military coup.  However, Tresckow is also at 
fault here since he helped in the final revisions of the plan.  Secondly, two key military 
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figures were not recruited to the resistance, while one did not remain loyal to the 
conspiracy.  Tresckow deserves a larger portion of this blame as two of his contacts 
failed, while Olbricht can also be criticized for his failure to convince Fromm to support 
the plot.    	  
Operation Valkyrie itself was fatally flawed in three ways.  Firstly, the initiation 
of the coup depended upon the inflexible precondition of Hitler's death.  The teleprinter 
messages sent by the conspirators on July 20 began with, "(1) The Führer Adolf Hitler is 
dead.  An irresponsible gang of Party leaders, far behind the front, has tried to exploit this 
situation to stab the hard-pressed army in the back and seize power for its own ends. (2) 
In this hour of supreme danger the Reich government, to maintain law and order, has 
proclaimed a state of military emergency."185  From the outset, Valkyrie declared that 
Hitler's death was necessary to activate the orders and hand power over to the army.  In 
fact, this requirement to set the plan in motion did not give the conspirators any room to 
readjust in the event that Hitler survived the bomb explosion.  Due to Tresckow and 
Olbricht's prior experience and failures with assassination, they should have known that 
"however devoutly to be wished, [the assassination of Hitler] was infuriatingly difficult to 
achieve," and therefore the attempt on July 20 also may not succeed.186  Unfortunately, 
this possibility of failure did not prompt Tresckow and Olbricht to write in an alternative 
means to grasp power that did not include the Führer's demise.  The failure to kill Hitler 
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exacerbated the second fatal flaw of Valkyrie, the incomplete takeover of 
communications. 	  
Operation Valkyrie did not account for the conspirators' monopoly over all forms 
of communication, especially the radio waves.  From the beginning, the plotters 
recognized the importance of sending out radio announcements about Hitler's death, as 
well as messages containing the Valkyrie orders, making them fortunate to have Major 
General Erich Fellgiebel, the chief signals officer of the Wehrmacht, on their side.187  
Fellgiebel "would insure that the headquarters [the Wolf’s Lair] would be cut off from 
the outside world for several hours, so that the initial action could not be thwarted by 
counter-orders."188  However, Fellgiebel had stated that Hitler must be killed before 
communications could be completely secured.  Aside from Fellgiebel, other signals 
operators who were not part of the coup would likely not aid the conspirators until they 
were sure Hitler was dead, again demonstrating how the dictator's death was too rigid a 
requirement for the initiation of Operation Valkyrie.189  However, although Fellgiebel did 
promise to ensure that the conspirators' messages went through with no issues, "On the 
other hand he never promised that he would destroy or cause to be destroyed any signals 
installations," which included the telephone, teleprinter, radio, and courier services 
coming from the Wolf's Lair, with the first three being the most important.190  It was 
virtually impossible to stop radio traffic coming from the Lair without the use of force, 
and these conspirators would not be available in the early stages of the coup, meaning 
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that radio messages could only be ceased via an order.  It was unlikely that high-ranking 
Nazis such as Ribbentrop and Himmler would obey an order of this nature from 
Fellgiebel, even though he had considerable power, and he did not have the troops to 
enforce his demands.191  	  
Because the conspirators were not able to block the Nazis from getting back on 
the radio network for long enough, Hitler was able to get on and announce that he was 
alive, stating, "So that you may hear my voice and know that I am in good health and 
quite uninjured; and in addition so that you may hear the details of a crime unparalleled 
in German history...A conspiracy was hatched by a tiny clique of ambitious, 
conscienceless, and at the same time stupid and criminal officers."192  Hitler's 
announcement that he was alive blew the cover of legality the conspiracy had enjoyed for 
a short time, and alerted the Nazis to the coup.  The Nazis were also able to issue the 
following radio message that aided in unraveling the plot, "The Führer is alive! In perfect 
health! Reichsführer-SS C-in-C Replacement Army.  Only his orders valid.  Orders from 
Colonel-General Fromm, Field Marshal von Witzleben and Colonel-General Hoepner not 
to be executed! Maintain contact with Gautleiter and Senior SS and Police 
Commander!"193  Furthermore, due to the fact that the conspirators had issued the 
Valkyrie orders in Fromm's name, this announcement also hurt their official cover.  
Although Fellgiebel blocked these radio messages from the Nazis for almost an hour, "as 
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soon as Hitler demanded to be put through to Berlin, he was forced to comply."194  As 
soon as it was announced that no orders from Fromm were to be obeyed, the third flaw of 
Valkyrie became apparent.	  
The third reason Valkyrie itself was imperfect was because its issuance depended 
upon the cooperation of Colonel-General Fromm, a fair weather supporter of the 
conspiracy and the Commander of the Replacement Army.195  Fromm was careful to 
appear neutral and would frequently shift his allegiances so he would always be on the 
victorious side.196  With the July 20 coup, he had decided that if the assassination attempt 
failed, he would not support the conspirators.197  Stauffenberg and Olbricht were the 
second and third ranking officials respectively in the Replacement Army, yet despite this 
they could not issue the Valkyrie orders.198  When Olbricht went to inform Fromm that 
Hitler was dead and that Valkyrie should be set in motion, Fromm "refused to proclaim 
martial law on the strength of an single uncorroborated report."199  Fromm called the 
Wolf's Lair and to Olbricht's surprise Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel answered and 
informed him that everything was fine, and although there had been an attempted 
assassination, Hitler was alive.200  The Valkyrie orders were only issued when 
Stauffenberg returned to Berlin from the Wolf’s Lair and arrested Fromm.201  Fromm's 
lack of compliance demonstrated this third flaw of the Valkyrie plan itself and was a 
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primary reason for its delayed execution, another part of the explanation for why the coup 
failed.                                                                                                                                                               
 Due to Fromm's lack of cooperation, Olbricht did not initiate Operation Valkyrie 
because his superior and commander of the Replacement Army did not believe it 
necessary since there was uncertainty of Hitler's demise.  Olbricht was not willing to 
issue Valkyrie by forging Fromm's name because he "lacked revolutionary energy."202  
He preferred to wait for Fromm to approve the issuance of Valkyrie rather than take the 
initiative himself.203  However, Olbricht was supposed to have issued the Valkyrie orders 
two hours prior to the bomb explosion in order to account for the time it would take to get 
troops assembled and moving.204  Being that Olbricht was the original revisor of 
Valkyrie, he knew that there was no time to waste in setting the plan in motion, yet in 
spite of this fact he did not.  Olbricht went to lunch instead and did not return until 3 p.m. 
when Stauffenberg's flight arrived back from the Wolf's Lair.  Valkyrie was not officially 
signed into action until 4 p.m. and therefore the teleprinter orders did not reach their 
intended destinations until after normal office hours.  This waste of time meant that 
approximately three precious hours were lost as the bomb had detonated around 12:50 
p.m.205  Furthermore, at 6:30 p.m. the Nazis broadcast a radio message (quoted above) 
stating that there had been an attempt on Hitler's life but that the Führer was fine.  This 
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meant that the justification for the conspirators issuance of orders was now gone.206 
Operation Valkyrie was executed late, but also incorrectly once it began due to a major 
mistake that Olbricht made.                     	  
Olbricht's serious blunder was his miscommunication with Arthur Nebe and the 
police, who were assigned the crucial task of arresting Nazi leaders.  On July 13, a few 
days before Stauffenberg’s attempt, Nebe paid Olbricht a call so that the two could 
discuss what the duties of the police would be.  Olbricht presented Nebe with maps of 
Berlin so the police would know where to occupy, but it dated to the time of Stalingrad 
from 1942-1943.  Since that time, many of the buildings and other infrastructure had been 
destroyed by Allied bombings.  Furthermore, many offices that had been housed in 
destroyed buildings had moved locations, but, according to the maps, did not indicate 
where they might have moved.207  Additionally, the map did not specify how strong the 
SS units were or where they were located in Berlin, although this would be necessary to 
know because the justification for initiating Valkyrie was that Hitler had died and party 
leaders, possibly the SS, were trying to seize power via their own coup.208  Aside from 
the map, Olbricht did not arrange with the police how the arrests of major Nazi officials 
were supposed to take place.209  The result was disorganization and confusion on July 20.	  
While Olbricht claims primary blame for why the seizure of power in Berlin did 
not run smoothly, Tresckow is mainly faulted for his failure to recruit key military figures 
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to the conspiracy.  The main actor not convinced to join the resistance was Field Marshal 
Erich von Manstein, whose inclusion would have provided several advantages.  
Furthermore, some of the contacts Tresckow had tried to establish did not hold up.  Field 
Marshal von Kluge, who often wavered between support for the conspiracy and for 
Hitler, chose allegiance to the latter on July 20.  Likewise, Olbricht failed to convince 
Colonel-General Fromm, the commander of the Replacement Army and his immediate 
superior, to join the resistance, which would have made it much easier to initiate 
Operation Valkyrie.       
Since late 1939, Tresckow had tried repeatedly to convince Field Marshal Erich 
von Manstein, a commander at Army Group South, to join the conspiracy,210 however, 
the latter always put the oath he had taken to Hitler first, which prevented him from 
engaging in rebellious activity against the Führer.211  As part of his duty to Hitler, 
Manstein saw it as his responsibility to prevent the Russians from breaking through 
Germany’s borders, while Tresckow may have preferred him to let the enemy break 
through, as he wanted Kluge to do on the Western Front.212  Still, there was perhaps an 
even more negative result of Manstein’s refusal to cooperate.  At the end of 1943, 
Manstein refused to appoint Tresckow as his chief of staff, which would have given the 
latter access to Hitler’s headquarters.213  If Tresckow had gotten admittance to the 
headquarters and he, instead of Stauffenberg, had planted the bomb on July 20, this 
would have made a difference.  Stauffenberg had sustained injuries during the war that 
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had left him severely handicapped, and which prevented him from activating two bombs 
for use at the Wolf’s Lair.  Tresckow, who was fully able to prepare the bombs and who 
was very familiar with them due to the tests he conducted with Schlabrendorff, may have 
been able to actually kill Hitler and afford the conspiracy a better chance to seize 
governmental power from the Nazis.  As with Manstein, Tresckow also experienced bad 
luck in regards to Kluge’s allegiance. 
Tresckow had realized early, as mentioned above, that in order for the coup to be 
successful, it needed to include an established military figure.  To persuade Kluge to 
support the conspiracy, he arranged a meeting between the Field Marshal and Carl 
Goerdeler, and also made sure that his staff provided Kluge with the worst information 
about Nazi wartime activities, such as the atrocities committed by the Einsatzgruppen, 
hoping that these reports would convince him that the regime must be destroyed.214  After 
a back-and-forth battle, Tresckow finally won Kluge over by early 1943, and the latter 
pledged to let the enemy break through his lines on July 20 so he could negotiate an 
armistice with the Allies.  However, Kluge only promised to do this if Hitler was 
successfully assassinated.  One of the main reasons he had this precondition was that it 
would be difficult to gain willing support from soldiers if the person they had taken an 
oath of loyalty to was still alive.215  	  
On July 20, since Hitler had not been killed, "Kluge remained true to his own 
principles.  Since Hitler was not dead, he would not countenance the coup; but he did 
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utter the wistful words, 'If only the pig were dead...'"216  If Tresckow had been with Kluge 
on July 20, it would have been interesting to see if the latter would have supported the 
conspiracy after all, because the Field Marshal was intimidated by his chief of staff and 
"was the perfect anti-Nazi" when he was around.217  Overall, Kluge did not possess the 
moral courage of men like Tresckow and Olbricht, which held him back from rejecting 
Nazism and seeking to work out a cease-fire with the Allies, which could have played a 
large role in ending the National Socialist regime.218  A few days after July 20, Kluge 
became paranoid that his pseudo-involvement in the conspiracy would be discovered and 
Hitler would order his execution, so he committed suicide by swallowing poison.219    	  
While Tresckow was unsuccessful in gaining the support of Field Marshals von 
Manstein and von Kluge, Olbricht did not persuade Colonel-General Fromm to join the 
conspiracy.  Even as early as 1942, when Olbricht and Tresckow were working on the 
assassination attempt that would ultimately occur on March 13, 1943, Olbricht was still 
trying to recruit Fromm to the resistance, but to no avail.220  The inclusion of Fromm as a 
conspirator would have made it much easier to put Valkyrie into action, as it would not 
have aggravated the third fatal flaw of the plan.  This defect, as mentioned above, was 
that the initiation of Valkyrie required Fromm’s signature.  Because Fromm did not put 
the plan into motion and Olbricht did not possess the vigor to bypass his superior, the 
result was a delay, which allowed the Nazis time to send out radio announcements 
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announcing that the Führer was alive and the military was trying to take governmental 
control.  If the orders had been issued two hours prior to the assassination, like they were 
supposed to have been, then there is a chance, however slim, that the conspiracy would 
have met with success, even though Hitler survived. 
Although Major-General Henning von Tresckow and General Friedrich Olbricht 
continue to be overshadowed by Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg, this does not change 
the fact that they, and not the Colonel, were the primary architects of the July 20 plot and 
its two corresponding parts, assassination and coup.  Without the work of these two men 
during their time in the military resistance leading up to July 20, 1944, the conspiracy 
would likely have never been attempted, let alone gotten as close to success as it did.  
However, being that they were the main engineers of this plot, a majority of the 
responsibility for its failure falls on their shoulders.  The July 20 plot came the closest to 
success of any before it, but nonetheless served to be a death knell for the military 
resistance, as the Nazis severely punished those involved. 
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